Professor Daniel D. Hutto
Professor of Philosophical Psychology
DPhil (York, England); MPhil (St. Andrews, Scotland); BA (Marist, USA)
Room number: 19.2021
Phone number: +61 (0) 2 4221 3987
Born and schooled in New York, I finished my undergraduate degree as a study abroad student in St Andrews, Scotland where my maternal roots lie. I returned to New York to teach fourth grade in the Bronx for a year in order to fund my MPhil in Logic and Metaphysics. After that I carried on my doctoral work in York, England. I lived in England with my wife and three lads for over 20 years. Australia is our new home.
My research is a sustained attempt to understand human nature in a way which respects natural science but which nevertheless rejects the impersonal metaphysics of much contemporary naturalism. In my most recent work I have developed a basic non-representational account of intentionality and phenomenal experience and proposals about what lies at the roots of our everyday social understanding. Reaching beyond philosophy, I have often been invited to speak at conferences and expert meetings.
I am co-author of the award-winning Radicalizing Enactivism (MIT, 2013) and its sequel, Evolving Enactivism (MIT, 2017). Amongst my other major works are Folk Psychological Narratives (MIT, 2008) and Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy (Palgrave, 2006). I am editor of Narrative and Understanding Persons (CUP, 2007) and Narrative and Folk Psychology (Imprint Academic, 2009). A special yearbook, Radical Enactivism, focusing on my philosophy of intentionality, phenomenology and narrative, was published in 2006.
I am called upon regularly to serve major research bodies worldwide: including the European Research Council (ERC); Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), UK; and the National Science Foundation (NSF)/National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), USA. Since migrating to Australia I have joined the Australian Research Council (ARC) College of Experts, and served as Chair of its Humanities and Creative Arts Panel.
Research interests/Areas of expertise
Although an analytic philosopher, by training, I adopt a broad and ecumenical approach to philosophical inquiry, willingly embracing justified insights from any school of thought. My recent research focuses primarily on issues in philosophy of mind, psychology and cognitive science. I am best known for promoting thoroughly non-representational accounts of enactive and embodied cognition, and for having developed a hypothesis which claims that engaging with narratives, understood as public artefacts, plays a critical role in underpinning distinctively human forms of cognition.
Philosophy of Cognitive Science/Mind/Psychology
- Agency; Connectionism; Emotions; Embodied Mind and Cognition; Enactivism; Extended Mind; Evolutionary Psychology; Functionalism; Folk Psychology; Imagination; Intentionality; Knowledge of Other Minds; Mental Causation; Memory; Mental Representation and Content; Mental Time Travel; Metaphysics of Mind/Consciousness; Neurophenomenology; Non-Conceptual Content; Perception; Social Minds
- Analytic Philosophy; Experimental philosophy; Philosophical Naturalism/Physicalism; Pragmatism
Philosophy of Psychiatry
- Mental Conditions/Disorders; Delusions
Philosophy of Language
- Semantic Externalism; Meaning; Truth
- Daniel Dennett; Donald Davidson; Wittgenstein
Links to Webpages
- Institutional webpage (with full publication list and details of: impact and engagement; funded projects; research supervisions)
- Downloadable papers and pre-prints on Academia.edu
- Google Scholar page
- Searchable RIS Publications
Selected Major Publications
Major Referred Journal Articles
- “Getting Into the Great Guessing Game of Predictive Processing: Bootstrap Heaven or Hell?” Synthese. (2017). doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1385-0
- “Basic Social Cognition without Mindreading”. Synthese. 194:3. (2017). 827-846.
- “Re-authoring Narrative Therapy”. (co-authored with Gallagher, S). Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology. 24:2. (2017). 157-167.
- “Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 15:1. (2016). 21–41.
- “Overly Enactive Imagination? Radically Re-Imagining Imagining”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 53. (2015). 68–89.
- “The Natural Origins of Content”. Philosophia. (co-authored with G. Satne). 43:3. (2015). 521–536.
- “Extensive Enactivism: Why Keep it All in?” (co-authored with Kirchhoff, M and Myin, E). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. (2014). doi 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00706.
- “Enactivism: From a Wittgensteinian Point of View” American Philosophical Quarterly. 50: 3. (2013). 281-302.
- “Fictionalism about Folk Psychology” The Monist. 96: 4. (2013). 585–607.
- “Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale” American Philosophical Quarterly. 48 (2) 129 – 145. (2011). (Translated into French and reprinted in a special issue of Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage)
- “The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology” Philosophy: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 82: 60 (2007). Also in Narrative and Understanding Persons. Hutto, D. (ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2007). 43–68.
- “The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology” Mind and Language. 19:5. (2004). 548–73
- “A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59:2. (1999). 381–401. Reprinted in Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. D’Oro, G. and Sandis, C. (eds). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2013). 49-74.
- “Davidson’s Identity Crisis” Dialectica, 52:1. (1998). 45–61.
- “Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein” (co-authored with J. Lippitt) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. XCVIII, part III. (1998). 265–286.
- “Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project” The Monist. 78:4. (1995). 464–478.